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Abstract
This work outlines the novel application of the empirical analysis of causa-
tion, presented by Kutach, to the study of information theory and its role
in physics. The central thesis of this paper is that causation and informa-
tion are identical functional tools for distinguishing controllable correlations,
and that this leads to a consistent view, not only of information theory, but
also of statistical physics and quantum information. This approach comes
without the metaphysical baggage of declaring information a fundamental
ingredient in physical reality and exorcises many of the otherwise puzzling
problems that arise from this view-point, particularly obviating the problem
of ‘excess baggage’ in quantum mechanics. This solution is achieved via a
separation between information carrying causal correlations of a single qubit
and the bulk of its state space.
1. Introduction
Fundamental or provisionally fundamental physical laws have no causal
character. This curiosity, prominently remarked upon by Russell [1], neces-
sitates some elaboration: a notion of causation requires both that there is an
asymmetry in determination (if A causes B then B cannot be said to cause
A) and that causes are well-defined local factors [1, 2]. Physical law cannot be
said to be causal as it does not satisfy either requirement: initial/boundary
conditions specified at a given time t can be said to determine the infinite
past of the system’s state as much as they determine its infinite future. More-
over, causal sequences can be falsified without the falsification of any physical
law [1], thus divorcing any notion of causation from laws themselves. What
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we are safe in declaring is that, using just their mathematical structure, all
ostensibly fundamental physical laws deal in correlations. That is, physical
laws answer the question: ‘if we take some event C, what further events (or
past events) E could we expect with what probabilities?’. The inclusion of
probability here is for the sake of generality, we need not insist on whether or
not probabilities could be universally applicable. The sequential associations
of events or the evolution of the physical state of some system are then the
correlations referred to. Despite this, notions of causal correlation are deeply
useful from a practical standpoint, as their importance in the work of many
scientific fields, as well as common sense, attests to. The primitive notion of
causation is that two events are more explicitly linked than merely occurring
often together. The ‘cause’ event in fact directly induces the ‘effect’ event
(or at least makes it significantly more likely to occur than other outcomes),
in a manner we can see is quite opposed to the ambiguity of fundamental
physical laws, which uniformly and symmetrically relate a very large set of
events indeed.
In order to reconcile these differences we can turn to the empirical analy-
sis theory of causality due to Kutach [2], and take causality to be how we, as
scientists and humans, distinguish controllable correlations from those that
we cannot control. Thus, ‘cause-effect’ relations are excised from our meta-
physics, but can still be described in terms of physical laws. This statement
of causality is a highly simplified one and it is worth spending some time in
explanation. However, for a truly thorough treatment the reader is invited
to consult the aforementioned work of Kutach.
This empirical analysis of causation is premised on two core principles:
that there is a distinction between some fundamental reality and a derivative
level, there is also a distinction between metaphysical and non-metaphysical
aspects of causation. This results in a division of reality into three layers for
the purpose of this analysis: the first being fundamental reality that is only
concerned with the metaphysics of causation, the other two being derivative
realities relating each to metaphysical and non-metaphysical aspects of cau-
sation. We will only be interested in those layers discussing the metaphysics
of causation and will simply refer to them as fundamental and derivative as
a result. Fundamental Reality (FR) is characterised by four simple points:
1. FR is how things really are
2. FR is the real basis for events in derivative reality
3. FR is as determinate as reality gets
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4. FR is consistent.
The reason these distinctions are useful is that the usual ‘cause-effect’ rela-
tion between bits of reality, each with certain characteristics, will be relevant
within the derivative levels of reality, it will not be part of the fundamental
metaphysics, but is ultimately predicated on the laws of fundamental real-
ity. It will be seen in the following that, ‘cause-effect’ relations depend only
on a part of the full fundamental situation, this being selected by means of
derivative phenomena. Implying that ‘cause-effect’ relations belong to no
one layer of reality, so they are safely excised from our metaphysics, obvi-
ating many problems that arise when ‘cause-effect’ relations are held to be
metaphysical necessities. This is justified on the basis of the following con-
sideration proposed in [2]: a ferromagnet consisting of spins is moved near a
device that detects currents via the deflection of a needle. The ‘cause-effect’
relation will consist of the motion of the magnet causing the deflection of
the needle. However, the movement of the spin system is only one event in
a very large set of fundamental events that result in the movement of the
needle. We single out the movement event because we believe it more signif-
icant (in a counterfactual sense) to the resulting effect than the other related
fundamental events.
To illustrate the distinction of fundamental and derivative realities we
can follow [2] in considering the framework of classical physics (as this was
once thought fundamental). This consists of a limited set of fundamental
objects needed to define the laws: particles, properties of mass and charge,
and a spacetime equipped with a distance relation. These ingredients are
a minimal set of all that is needed to explain fundamental classical reality.
Other objects that exist or occur as a result of these fundamental existents
are derivative as they are neither part of the framing of the fundamental laws
nor assumed in them [2]. An example of this is velocity in classical physics,
as this corresponds to no fundamental structure, needing a frame of reference
(not part of the fundamental set of existents) to have any definite value.
There are, of course, a wide variety of both one [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] and two [9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14] core concept analyses of causation where ‘cause-effect’ is
taken to be a metaphysical necessity. However, the difference here that results
in causation being merely an empirically useful derivative phenomenon is
that no one of the three layers of reality hosts the whole of a core concept
of causation or entirely encapsulates a ‘cause-effect’ relation. In this way,
causation can be described in terms of ‘effective strategies’, that is, a causal
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relation is one that some agent could in principle use to bring about a desired
effect. Note that this does not tie causation to agency, as this is merely
used to analyse what is permitted by physical law and no agent/agency is
necessary to the existence of causal relations. The agency can be better
understood as the freedom allowed by physical laws for any process to realise
some outcome in principle.
This approach to the study of causation will be formalised in this work,
and the mathematical formalism will then be leveraged to address several
key problems in the overlap of physics and information theory. This will be
done by demonstrating that the notion of information used in physics is iden-
tical to the definition of causation in terms of empirical analysis. Once this
identification has been made it becomes possible to obviate the circularity in
Shannon’s original definition of distinct states [15] and information. This is
because the notion of what states can carry information is now formulated
in terms of available causal correlations, which depend only on the possible
counterfactuals as well as the prescriptions of fundamental physical laws in
a manner similar to that recommended in [16].
The identity between causation and information is then used to address
the problem of ‘excess baggage’ in quantum mechanics [17], where states (if
they are in some way ontic) must seemingly carry both finite and infinite
amounts of classical information [18, 19], in contravention of the established
finite limits of the Holevo theorem [20]. The correspondence of information
and causation is used to tease out this problem and demonstrate that only the
finite information carried by the quantum state actually corresponds to causal
correlations of a single qubit, the infinite component is accommodated by an
ensemble of qubits only. This is of particular importance to the discussion
of the ontic status of the quantum wavefunction, as it would otherwise seem
impossible for an ontic wavefunction, as discussed in [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28], to contain infinite information and still obey the Holevo theorem.
Here the full utility of Kutach’s account of causation is realised, in that this
solution is only available when information can be regarded as an operational
tool only and not being part of our metaphysics. As is shown here, this can
be achieved through the identification of causation and information that is
possible through Kutach’s empirical account.
This paper is structured as follows: In section 2 the causal formalism is
layed out and discussed. Section 3 outlines the link between causation and
information in physics, and section 4 addresses the solution of excess baggage
problem.
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2. Causation
The first ingredient in this analysis of causation is the distinction between
fundamental and derivative reality. The latter of the two refers to the realm
of experience similar to the ‘classical world’ of common physical terminol-
ogy. Whereas fundamental reality is the domain of the basic forms of physical
law, quantum theory or any provisionally fundamental theory for instance.
The distinction is simply that the laws of derivative reality must be said to
be determined by those of the more fundamental underlying reality. This
distinction informs the way we talk about events within these two realities,
those that occur in derivative reality being the only cases where we must ex-
plain why causality might be useful or apparent. To this end we classify the
events of derivative reality as course-grained, such an event E is a collection
of fundamental events that might correspond to the derivative event, while
a contextualised event is course-grained with a reasonable probability distri-
bution over its members. In Kutach’s presentation, this distribution need
not be empirical or rigorous in any way (in order to accommodate informal
notions of causality), barring that it must satisfy the axioms of probability
theory.
In order to determine if two time-ordered events, A and B are causally
correlated we will employ the following terminology. The protrast of the
ordered pair (A,B) is a set of fundamental events in an event A that would
correlate with B being said to occur, whereas the contrast of (A,B) is a set
of events in a reasonably chosen contrasting event C that correlate with B
occurring, equivalent to imagining the causal pair (C,B) instead. We can
also, of course, consider causation in terms of a derivative event A and the
probability it evolves into B under apparent laws of derivative reality. At this
point it is worth remarking upon the fact that this formalism illustrates the
very close linkage of causality and counterfactuals. We note that Lewis [4]
championed analysis in terms of counterfactuals as giving a complete account
of causality, but the literature is littered with difficulties that this program
encounters (as described in [16, 29] for example). We will see, in the course
of this paper, that the empirical account of causation employed here has
far greater similarity to the approach advocated by Maudlin [16]. Whereby,
physical law provides the connection between counterfactuals and causation,
and is thus the vital ingredient needed to give a complete account. Thus, the
notion of a ‘reasonable choice’ of the contrasting event C is necessarily bound
up in what counterfactuals would be allowed by physical law. Since this work
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is focussed upon causation within formal systems of physics and information,
all counterfactual choices will not just be predicated on physical laws, but
rather admissible counterfactuals are in fact given directly by physical laws
of the system in question. In this sense, the framework for causation here
is more strict than it’s parent in Kutach’s work. However, this is just as a
result of a narrowing of focus for application to particular issues, rather than
the general explication of the metaphysics of causation that is the object of
the empirical framework itself. This will prove important as this restriction
is vital to be able to define some notion of ‘counting’ of causal correlations
within a given physical system.
In the context of an ordered pair of contextualised events C and E, the
probability of E given C is written as P (E|C). The nature of these prob-
abilities will be taken as the proportion of fundamental events in C which
will evolve into those within E, meaning there is a robust link between these
probabilities and objective frequency measurements. We can naturally ex-
pect a fully general discussion to be couched in terms of probabilities as not
all of the fundamental events in our course grained event C will necessarily
correlate with members of the same event E. The use of probability is then
motivated to account for the fact that an event C may result in several differ-
ent possible consequent events and the frequency of differing outcomes will
depend upon the strength of the underlying fundamental state correlations.
Kutach then invokes the notion of promotion: the degree to which C1 pro-
motes E is given by the difference between the propensity with which events
in C1 and those in a contrasting event C2 would evolve into those in E. This
propensity can be determined either through fundamental or derivative laws
(as these should agree on matters of empirical outcome promotion). We then
propose to formalise the degree to which C1 promotes E as the logarithmic
difference (we note that [2] employs a linear difference)
C(C1, E) = log
(
P (E|C1)
P (E|C2)
)
. (1)
This can be generalised to a larger set of events that might cause E, rather
than simply the two in {C1, C2}. To do so consider a set {Ci | i ∈ [1, N ]},
then
C(Cn, E) =
N∑
i 6=n
wi log
(
P (E|Cn)
P (E|Ci)
)
, (2)
where wi is a weight, given by
1
N
if we cannot define the probability P (Ci|Lphys),
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where this is conditioned on the relevant set of physical laws Lphys or if we
consider a scenario such as a symbols transmitted freely on some communi-
cation system. The function C(E,C) is then proposed as a measure of the
causal association of the events C and E. Under this assumption, if C(C,E)
is positive-definite we may conclude that it is reasonable to state that E is
causally correlated with C. However, if C(C,E) ≤ 0 then we must conclude
that on average other events that promote E equally or to a greater degree
than C does, making causal claims about (C,E) weak. The relative magni-
tude of the C function will also dictate the extent of the causal association
between the two events. This causal association can be understood as follows:
two events C and E are causally associated if there exists a physical scenario
whereby the event C occurring would offer a preponderant probability (over
and above most other strategies) of E being a consequence of C.
There are two approaches to continuous families of events, the first is a
simple generalisation of Eq. (2),
C(E,C) =
∫
dc log
(
P (E|C)
P (E|c)
)
. (3)
However, this presents a difficulty in enumerating causal correlations. There-
fore, the continuum should be reduced to a discrete case by identifying causal
classes of events. In general an event A in a continuous family can be char-
acterised by some set of parameters η, it seems appropriate to determine
whether A(η1) and A(η2) are contrasting events by the ‘outcome continuity’
of η. Thus if one can continuously deform η1 to obtain η2, without causing
a change in the most probable outcome of A(η), then the two events must be
seen to belong to the same ‘contrast class’, meaning they cannot be chosen
as contrasting events because they are causally equivalent. For a larger set of
outcomes a contrast class with constitute all events A(η) that preserve the
same probability heirachy. Continuity is important because the value of η
will serve to demonstrate control of a particular correlation, you can ‘tune’ η
to more strongly promote a given outcome while conducting what is ostensi-
bly the same experiment. We can appreciate the use of ‘outcome continuity’
if we view a lack of this as signalling that these events assign the greatest
probability to differing causal histories, making η1 and η2 causally distinct.
We note that η1 and η2 might anyway result in the same event history but
this does not damage the use of ‘outcome continuity’ as the argument is
probabilistic in nature.
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In order to take the concept of the contrast class into account, any prob-
ability P (E|A), where A ≡ A(η), will be assumed to be averaged over the
relevant continuous region of η unless otherwise stated. The reason for this
is to make causal arguments robust and not simply dependent on the choice
of parameters, which is of particular concern in the contrasting causes, as
these might otherwise be chosen to minimise their association with a given
outcome. This attempt to characterise contrasting events is aimed at allow-
ing physical law and operational considerations to determine our contrasting
event classes, in keeping with the important role of physical law in determin-
ing the counterfactuals necessary in causation. It is very clear that if we are
to make an empirical analysis of causation that we should only admit causal
counterfactuals that would stand up to empirical inspection.
In order to make full use of the function C we can make use of a causal
table. Illustrated below for a system with two events C1 and C2 with two
possible outcomes E1 and E2.
E1 E2
C1 C(E1|C1) C(E2|C1)
C2 C(E1|C2) C(E2|C2)
In this table we can scan down column i to pick out possible causes for event
Ei. These can then be tested by scanning across the row of a favoured cause
to see that it does not uniformally promote multiple outcomes.
The method of enumerating causal correlations in a given system requires
remarking upon. For a given correlation we might always pick the largest
C value and decide it is the only causal correlation. However, this cannot
be correct, as a simple example can show. Consider a configuration of N
molecules that results in a total energy E, which correlates with some ad-
ditional observable values. In principle there are many such configurations,
each of which has probability 1 of associating itself with measurements of
the observables that correlate to E. Thus, among this set of correlations all
have C = 0 as we cannot prefer any of them. Moreover, we might consider
all these states with energy E as one single causal class. It is evident that
this difficulty arises due to the determinism of the problem, in that states
have either P = 1 or P = 0. Additionally, one can appreciate that P = 0
states cannot be considered valid counterfactuals, so they cannot be included
to make C non-zero for those with P = 1. However, this difficulty can be
resolved simply because of the determinism, all of the P = 1 correlations
are causal, as though they have C = 0, they are deterministic and there are
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no other valid contrasts to consider. Thus, the process of enumeration must
be cautious, for a given effect we will take the causal classes with positive
C values to be the set of causal correlations that produce this effect, in the
case that all have the same C, or there appear to be no causal correlations
at all, we must carefully inspect the P values to confirm any conclusions.
Thus, we aim to present the causality measure C as a formal and math-
ematical realisation of Kutach’s promotion causality, allowing it to be used
in more specialised physical discussion as well as assessments of the general
use of causality.
It is evident that Kutach’s theory gives rise to the notion of causality as
a functional tool used to make the distinction between correlations we can
control and those which we cannot. Thus, we can see that causality can be
apparent within derivative reality without being a necessary ingredient of
fundamental reality. What must also be clear is that our causal expectations
will be recovered only if we select counterfactuals that are allowed by phys-
ical law and assign them physically sensible weightings, arbitrary fantasy
counterfactuals could, for obvious reasons, easily undo our reasonable causal
expectations (as argued by Maudlin [16]).
3. Information
To study the notion of information we will approach it from the perspec-
tive of communication and how this relates to the underlying physics. To
do so we must define some terms, the first being a dictionary : this is a set
of symbols which are assigned to some states within a physical system, each
symbol having some meaning which we are free to choose when specifying
the dictionary. For example we can encode a binary dictionary onto a cur-
rent being measured in a wire, no current detected is assigned the symbol 0
while detection above a given threshold is assigned 1. If we then measure the
current for a length of time we can translate this into a serious of 0’s and 1’s
which may be interpreted as a which may contain information. By determin-
ing the number of distinguishable states available to our transmitting system
we can calculate the Shannon entropy of a communication channel, in the
binary case we have two available states and thus a message of N symbols
on our channel has S ∝ N log (2) which provides an information measure
when the results of measurements on our system are treated as values of a
random variable. In this regard, the information ascribed to a message sent
on some physical channel can be considered as the apriori degree of unpre-
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dictability of the constituent symbols in the message. To discuss the relation
of causality and information let us first enumerate the correlations in our
binary system: we can have generation of current by some process at one
end of the wire that correlates with detection of a similar amplitude current
at the other end, or the case of no current being generated being correlated
with below-threshold current detected at the other end. However, there are
other correlations available to the binary system: these being the cases of
‘mis-correlation’, where we detect a current without being correlated to gen-
eration or where we detect no current despite a current being generated. At
least some of these ‘mis-correlations’ would be physically justifiable, so we
must ask under what conditions can we use the distinguishable states of a
system to encode information. It is then clear that if we wish to use the dis-
tinguishable states of a system to transmit information then we must be able
to reliably induce particular correlations in that system. Otherwise, the very
notion of the ‘distinguishability’ of these states is lost. In the binary system
for instance, if we cannot reliably induce a current that is found upon subse-
quent measurement to be above the given threshold then we are in danger of
scrambling any message on our channel, as our 1’s might frequently appear
as 0’s (and thus no longer be clearly distinguished between). A particular
physical system X can then be said to be capable of transmitting/containing
information if we can reliably map some dictionary onto a subset of possible
correlations within that system. We contend that this subset is composed of
only the causal correlations of the system in question. This can be demon-
strated using the terminology established in the previous discussion. Let A
be the process we use to attempt to induce a particular physical state x in
the system X and B be the realisation/measurement of that state. Then,
if we have a case where C(A,B) ≤ 0, or |C| ≤ ǫ, we must conclude that
whether or not we can realise our desired state x through the process A is
highly mis-correlated and cannot be said to produce a distinguishable state.
Therefore, if we attempt to transmit/store a sequence of symbols with X it
will be akin to a stream of bits where 1 and 0 are frequently interchanged,
garbling any message we might send and thus preventing us from trans-
mitting any desired information. Clearly if all correlations available to the
system have C = 0 (and are confirmed non-causal) we must conclude that
there can be no information transmitted/stored. Every added correlation
class with C significantly greater than zero must therefore expand the pos-
sible information content of messages realised within the system, as we can
reliably expand our dictionary with each added causal correlation. We can
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therefore conclude that for a correlation to contain information it must nec-
essarily be a causal correlation and conversely that any causal correlation
may store or transmit information. Thus we propose that the information
capacity of a physical channel is framed in terms of the channel’s causal cor-
relations rather than distinguishable states. Importantly this definition of
information clears up the problem of circularity in Shannon’s original defini-
tion: Information can only be encoded in/transmitted via causal correlations
of some physical system and these are defined by the measure C and thus
by the possible counterfactuals and probabilities derived from our theory of
physical law. This means that, although causal correlations are those that
can carry information, they are not defined as such and thus any circularity
is obviated. Additionally, the definition of causal classes provides a natural
way to obviate problems of distinguishability in continuous variable systems,
by differentiating between them via their promotion of outcomes. Further-
more, we also find that the Shannon entropy can be determined through
the counting of causal correlations available to the system. This is because
this counting is degenerate with that of distinguishable physical states when
these are members of derivative reality (this being the domain of ‘classical’
information theory). However, the examples presented in the remainder of
this work will demonstrate that the counting of causal correlations provides a
far more robust and consistent measure of information content. Generalising
the counting of causal correlations, by analogy with Shannon theory [15], the
entropy becomes
S = −
N∑
i=1
pi log (pi) , (4)
where the sum runs over the causal correlation classes corresponding to the
contextualised pairs (Ai,Bi). The weight pi of each correlation class is the
probability of the correlation being realised.
The preceding arguments suggest a striking agreement between the no-
tions of derivative empirical causation and information. It follows that this
equivalence implies that there is nothing ‘informational’ in the laws that
govern our fundamental reality, just as these laws are not causal. This must
follow from the notion that causality is not so much a property of any funda-
mental reality as it is a tool for its analysis, so information is not a physical
property of correlations as much as it is a flag of the controllability of said cor-
relations. This stands at odds with a prevailing school of thought within the
physical sciences which champions the ‘information is physical’ view-point,
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notably articulated by Brillouin [30] and Deutsch [31] among others. In this
paradigm information is a fundamental ingredient in laws of physics, and
that information itself is an essentially physical quantity. For this reason we
must supply an argument as to why information seems sufficiently significant
in physics as to warrant such extraordinary metaphysical assertions, while
being simply a tool of studying reality. It must be immediately apparent that
this is answered by the entire premise of the presented model of causality,
or simply put: information theory is so applicable in sciences because its
very formulation guarantees it to be so. In fact the nature of information
capacity as a demarcation between useful and non-useful correlations makes
it impossible that it would not be applicable to the study of correlation and
regularity that tends to compose the majority of sciences. We note that
this does not justify the scientific status of the use of causality/information,
but merely explains it. The justification of the use of causation in scientific
endeavour will be examined in future work.
In this particular work we apply this causal account of information to
problems in quantum information theory. This means we must ask if this
notion of information is adequate to the task. We can immediately see that
this causal account of information, being structured on the division between
fundamental and derivative reality, is immediately well suited to quantum
mechanical problems which involve extracting information via measurements
conducted in derivative (classical) reality from where it is transmitted/stored
in states that are members of fundamental (quantum) reality.
4. Excess Baggage and Quantum Information
In quantum mechanics it has been demonstrated that a ‘qubit’ system
with two measurable states, referred to as ‘up’ or |↑〉 and ‘down’ or |↓〉,
possesses a vast space of possible quantum states [32]. Commonly this is
interpreted as meaning we should be able to encode a huge amount of re-
trievable/‘classical’ information in such a system [17, 18] as this should scale
with the size of the state space (according to the notion that information is
a property of distinguishable states). This becomes remarkable when it is
observed that we cannot retrieve any more than one bit from such a system,
as argued by the Holevo theorem [20]. This is immediately problematic if
the state of the system is viewed in a realist fashion as the apparently real
state space does not correspond to real retrievable information. All the non-
retrievable information is thus referred to as ‘excess baggage’ by Hardy [17]
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and it must be explained why such a vast state space can offer up so little
information. This problem can be viewed as follows: the states of a qubit can
be expressed as the points on the surface of a sphere of unit radius, known as
the Bloch sphere. Thus, they are a function of two continuous parameters.
This means that, for a given qubit, the probabilities of measuring ‘up’ or
‘down’ vary continuously depending on the basis we choose to measure the
qubit in [19, 32]. This suggests that for every possible basis the qubit repre-
sents a different statistical preparation of a classical bit (referred to as a ‘bit’
hereafter). Therefore, a qubit can be represented by a continuous infinity of
bits and must contain an arbitrarily large amount of information. Clearly
then there is some disagreement between how much information a given qubit
preparation actually contains, and it is necessary to provide an information
measure that is consistent with both the Holevo bound and the argument
outlined above. One resolution to this is to assert that the quantum state
has no direct relation to any underlying ontology. However, in this work we
will consider a solution independent of ontic or epistemic assertions. Despite
this, a solution to the problem of excess baggage is of prime importance to
ontic formulations of quantum mechanics, where the quantum state ψ is a
part of physical reality and not merely a summary of information available
to some observer (as in an epistemic formulation). It may, of course, be pos-
sible to avoid the problem of excess baggage by suggesting that although a
physical system may occupy a superposition state (in an ontic view of states)
it does not immediately entail that the property values of the qubit are in
reality superposed as well. As this would mean that we need not account all
the possible property values of the qubit when we construct our information
measure and the infinite component of the information thus vanishes. How-
ever, the solution we present here is available without need to further justify
considerations such as the aforementioned. The value of our approach is then
that it is more strongly general and made available via the empirical causal
analysis of Kutach.
Having established the problem we can mobilise the machinery devel-
oped earlier by realising that our coarse-grained events are the preparation
and subsequent measurement of the qubit. This means that we will look at
what causal correlations or information transmission is possible with the set
of events: preparation of some FR state with desired measurement probabil-
ities and measuring one of two qubit values with some classical apparatus.
Additionally, our dictionaries are being chosen as follows: bit value ‘1’ maps
to |↑〉 and ‘0’ maps to |↓〉. This means that the dictionary is actually chosen
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when we choose basis, as this decides what we are measuring when we speak
of |↑〉 and |↓〉. Thus, rather than being represented by a continuous infinity
of bits, a qubit is in fact compatible with a continuous infinity of seemingly
independent dictionaries. It must be remarked upon that the same case can-
not be made for a bit, as even though we could describe a given bit in any
basis we please, the commutativity and non-contextuality of it’s algebraic
description lead all bases to map unambiguously between their particular |↑〉
and |↓〉 states. The qubit, however, exhibits both non-commutativity of it’s
observables and the measured values of “up” and “down” are strongly basis
dependent (if we consider “up” and “down” as poles on a sphere, a choice
of basis corresponds to a choice of the polar axis). The properties of the
operator algebra thus lead to a lack of unique mappings between |↑〉 states in
different bases. In other words, a measurable |↑〉
1
state in a given basis could
map to a linear combination of the measurable |↑〉
2
and |↓〉
2
states in another
basis. This means that measuring |↑〉
2
cannot be unambiguously mapped to
the result of a counterfactual measurement in the basis defined by |↑〉
1
and
|↓〉
1
. This would seem to suggest that we should be able to represent the
qubit as an infinite set of independent bits (one per basis). However, the
lack of consistent counterfactual statements regarding the choice to measure
in different bases will inevitably lead us to find that causal correlations in
one basis will be incompatible with those in other bases and, by implication,
the information content of a qubit is basis-dependent. Therefore, as a first
step we can establish that the reason the qubit appears to be represented
by infinite classical bits stems from the non-commutativity of its observable
operators and the resulting basis-dependence of what we are measuring when
we speak of ↑ and ↓ values.
If we examine the causal correlations of a qubit in a given basis then we
can see that the Holevo bounds emerges as follows: the causal correlations
of a qubit in some basis depend on continuous parameters and can be di-
vided into two equally weighted classes, ‘prepare mostly up and measure up’
and ‘prepare mostly down and measure down’, these are separated by a dis-
continuity, in the form of a class of random correlations that cannot belong
to either of the aforementioned causal classes, as they do not differ in their
promotion of contrasting outcomes. This means that the causal correlation
space of a qubit in a given basis matches that of the statistical preparation
of a bit. Therefore, since we must choose a basis to measure in, we will
always find that the qubit can at most yield up one bit of information upon
measurement. If we choose to measure in a different basis we will find that
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the causal correlation spaces of different bases are not necessarily compati-
ble. For instance, if we define two bases β1 and β2 such that β2 is rotated
by an angle θ along one of the Bloch sphere directions. We then prepare a
qubit so that we can transmit one bit via the causal correlations of β1. The
|↑〉
1
and |↓〉
1
, which are causally associated with our preparation, each cor-
respond to superpositions of |↑〉
2
and |↓〉
2
. This means that we find that it
becomes highly unreliable to retrieve the β1 bit by measuring in β2 but also
that encoding a β2 correlation with our β1 preparation is just as unreliable
(in the sense that we lose distinguishability of states). This is an important
issue, the two bits in bases 1 and 2 are not truly independent, so the infinite
set of dictionaries do not in fact encode an infinite set of bits.
This can be fully illustrated by considering a state |ψ〉
1
= |↓〉
1
. In basis 2
there is a probability ∝ sin (θ)2 of a measurement yielding |↑〉
2
. Thus, we can
see that as we increase θ we are merely travelling through the causal class
‘prepare mostly down and measure down’. As we reach some θ⋆ we transition
into the random class and afterwards proceed into the ‘prepare mostly up
and measure up’ class. Thus it is clear that the bases 1 and 2 do not posses
different causal correlations, they just represent a rotation of the causal class
chosen in the preparation basis. Thus, regardless of what basis we choose,
we never increase the number of causal classes available to the qubit, there
are always just two.
Effectively the basis-dependent behaviour of the qubit observables both
seems to add the potential to set up simultaneous ‘multi-bit’ causal cor-
relations as well as providing the linkage between bases that prevents any
attempt to do so. This makes it clear that we cannot independently encode
multiple bits upon a single qubit, and that the basis-dependence of the qubit
observables leads it to appear to be composed of infinite classical bits while
still obeying the Holevo bound.
It is worth noting that we could encode multiple independent bits in the
superposition structure of a qubit state in some β∗, though doing so does
nothing to change the number of causal correlations available to the qubit,
as our argument above does not depend upon superposition details. However,
this preparation does change the causal correlations available to an ensemble
of such qubits. This is the case because we cannot extract superposition
structure in a single measurement without a Holevo violation. In practice we
must perform quantum state tomography and make many measurements to
reconstruct the wavefunction. The amplitudes of the states in superposition
can then be used to carry information in the same manner as a string of digits.
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However, these strings are not accessible without an ensemble of qubits to
perform tomography upon. In this sense we would not truly increase the
information content of a single qubit, as its causal space is unchanged, merely
we have exploited the larger causal space of a qubit ensemble. Why is this
the case if the information is in ψ which describes the qubit? It is because
ψ describes the situation of a qubit with a given preparation in a given
measurement process, i.e. it details the entire experimental arrangement
and the extra information is being encoded in the statistical relationship
between qubits in the ensemble.
We note that there is a strong similarity between our solution here and
that discussed by Timpson [33]. In that Timpson suggests the excess baggage
arises from the difference in the amount of information needed to fully specify
the state of a quantum system and the amount of information accessible via
measurement (this distinction is argued not to arise in the classical case). It is
clear that the solution presented here realises a very similar scenario but does
so via the use of the empirical analysis of causation to justify the distinction
and simultaneously why excess baggage does not arise in a classical context.
An important aspect of the resolution of the excess baggage problem
is that it is completely independent of ontological preference. Thus it ob-
viates the difficulties experienced by ψ-ontology in this regard [18]. How-
ever, it is worth noting that it does not then favour any particular on-
tological/epistemological view-point in quantum mechanics. The empiri-
cal/operational nature of the approach makes it agnostic towards interpre-
tation or metaphysics.
This mode of explanation seems to break down when we include quantum
entanglement, in which case we can perform super-dense coding with shared
entanglement [34] and can retrieve 2N bits from N qubits. However, the
shared entangled state has merely increased the number of exploitable cor-
relations and this scenario remains within the remit of the interpretation of
information given here. In this scenario we have two sets of qubits, one held
by the receiver and one by the transmitter. These two sets are entangled,
with the sender and receiver both knowing the nature of the entanglement.
The receiver decodes two bits when sent a single qubit because the entangled
state basis has four states and four causal correlations. The need for shared
entanglement means that we never expand the causal classes of a single qubit,
as the qubit itself does not carry the information of the shared entanglement.
This is the case because, without apriori knowledge of the entanglement, we
cannot deduce it’s presence/nature from a single set of transmitted qubits,
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we need to compare ensembles to identify the entanglement. In this regard
it is similar to the superposition structure case above, the extra information
is being carried in the correlations between different sets of qubits. But, in
this case, we are also given knowledge of how our qubits correlate with the
qubits that are transmitted to us. Thus, our causal state space is built up
from two qubits and their correlations. The information content of a single
qubit system is unchanged and the addition of extra causal correlations is in
keeping with our causal explanation of information transmission.
What becomes evident is that the causal correlation view of information
applies to all retrievable information, as observable correlations all live within
the realm of derivative reality, in the vocabulary of quantum mechanics they
are ‘classical’ objects. This illustrates that the term ‘quantum information’
arises as a result of the asymmetry between the parameter space of quantum
states and that of causal correlations associated with those states.
It is evident that this view can still be reconciled with those expressed by
Cerf and Adami [35]: that quantum correlations, being members of funda-
mental reality and possessing ‘quantum information’ give rise to correlations
with ‘classical information’ within derivative reality, although it can only
lead to their conclusion that quantum information gives rise to classical in-
formation in the sense that some quantum correlations can map directly onto
causal relations.
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